FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OCT 30 2009

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRENCE BROWNLEE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ARTHUR VAN COURT; et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 08-15017

D.C. No. CV-06-02804-GEB/GGH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 13, 2009**

Before: B. FLETCHER, LEAVY, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Terrence Brownlee appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging improper denial of parole. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the

^{*} This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

district court's dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. *Ramirez v. Galaza*, 334 F.3d 850, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Brownlee's claims because defendants are immune from suit. *See Swift v. California*, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that parole board officials are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suits arising from decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole); *Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs.*, 554 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that prosecutors should be afforded absolute immunity for parole recommendations because parole decisions are a continuation of the sentencing process).

Brownlee's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.